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SECURITY AND OTHER VULNERABILITY PREDICTION USING NOVEL DEEP 
REPRESENTATION OF SOURCE CODE WITH ACTIVE FEEDBACK LOOP 
 










Since the cost of fixing vulnerabilities can be thirty times greater after an 
application has been deployed, it is recognized that properly-written code can yield 
potentially large savings. Accordingly, approaches presented herein apply machine 
learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to improve developer experience by 
enabling developers to avoid introducing potential bugs and/or vulnerabilities while 
coding.  Billions of lines of source code, which have already been written, are utilized as 
examples of how to write functional and secure code that is easy to read and to debug. By 
leveraging this wealth of available data, which is complemented with state-of-art machine 
learning models, enterprise-level software solutions can be developed that have a high 




Traditionally, the discovery of security and other vulnerabilities is performed at the 
end of a development cycle. Thus, vulnerabilities are typically found during the testing 
phase, the deployment phase, or even after an application is deployed. However, finding a 
security vulnerability in these stages incurs more cost and can be damaging to the 
credibility for a product. The techniques discussed herein employ shift-left error and 
vulnerability detection strategies to identify potential vulnerabilities as early as possible in 
the software development life cycle (i.e., during code development). 
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When software engineers write code for various features, various types of errors 
(e.g., coding, logic, semantic, etc.) can be introduced that may not be caught by compilation 
tools. Companies may thus be required to allocate a lot of resources in terms of both money 
and time in finding and fixing bugs that could have been avoided if coding was properly 
performed. In some cases, same or similar bugs that were fixed in past (although in 
different modules) can nevertheless be introduced in production code. 
Undetected flaws in software can lead to security vulnerabilities that potentially 
allow attackers to compromise systems and applications. Many traditional approaches 
include static and dynamic analyzers that utilize rule-based approaches to error detection; 
thus, these approaches are limited to the employed rules. These tools can further introduce 
false positives, causing critical findings to be buried in a sea of warnings. Moreover, 
conventional approaches fail to take application-specific field errors into account during 
future analyses. For example, when a possible issue is identified, no further insights on the 
issue’s impact are provided to the developer, nor are potential fixes. 
There is no AI-based system to that uses a deep representation of code to aid 
developers in identifying potential bugs and other issues that might exist in newly-
developed code based on the history of issues seen. Thus, information such as a list of 
similar functions and any references to bugs found on those functions could provide helpful 
insights to developers. 
Presented herein is a novel AI-based system that identifies potential bugs that are 
introduced at the time of development itself. For example, as a developer writes new code, 
the tool can integrate with the integrated development environment (IDE) as a plugin that 
works in the background, listing already-available similar functions or code-segments and 
any associated bugs in those functions. This feedback enables developers to incorporate 
suggestions immediately at the time of development, rather than waiting for a quality 
assurance technician or a customer to identify a defect. Also included herein is a novel 
approach of data cleaning, data preparation, and a feedback loop that utilizes as input two 
discrete data sources. 
To prepare the data, source code from a codebase is converted to an Abstract Syntax 
Tree (AST) representation. Using the AST, each method is represented with the set of 
encoded path context. The number of path context representations for a given function are 
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then computed. Initially, all path context representation from the AST are considered, and 
a ranking model is applied to eliminate some of the representations that occur commonly 
across the functions, as well as path contexts that are found in very few functions. Thus, 
overfitting of the model is avoided by increasing the nodes in the first layer of the model 
to account for the input dimensionality later. The minimum number of the occurrences of 
a path context is one of the hyper-parameters of this model. This method is found to work 
very effectively compared to considering all of the path context representations. 
Let P represents the set of path contexts in an AST. Each path context (p) will be 
of format {ni - pij - nj }, where ni and nj represent the encoded node values and p represents 
the encoded path values. Node encodings are numerical representations of each node in an 
AST. Similarly, path encodings are the numerical representation of each path in an AST. 
These numerical encodings enable conversion of the text to a number which can be then 
be used as input for the model being trained. 
Each path context that is obtained will then be filtered to remove the path contexts 
that occur very frequently (as those contexts do not aid in uniquely distinguishing the AST 
or the function of interest), along with the path contexts that occur very rarely (to avoid 
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Figure 1 
Figure 1 depicts a process for processing source code to select path contexts. A 
single vector representation (also referred to as code embedding or a code vector for a 
function) is obtained from the set of path contexts. A path context- and attention-based 
model is trained to learn the code vectors, which are the weighted average of the path 
embedding concatenated with the weighted average of the node embedding. Node 
embeddings and path embeddings are learned from the encodings during model training. 
The attention weights are learned from training the model itself. Thus, unlike conventional 
techniques, this approach uses both path embeddings and node embeddings to obtain path 
contexts, and selects them using an attention model. 
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Figure 2 
Figure 2 depicts a method of obtaining code embeddings, applying weights, and 
applying a trained model. For each p in P, the path context embedding, c, is learned during 
model training for each path according to the relation: 
 
 
The weighted average of all embeddings c is computed to obtain a single embedding 
representation for a given function. The weights are learned from the attention layers 




As depicted in Equation 2, a denotes the global attention vector which is initialized 
randomly and learned simultaneously with the network. 
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Thus, a vectorized representation for the code embeddings of each function present 
in the codebase is obtained. This representation is further enhanced by the addition of 
function names followed by their corresponding code vectors. As mentioned previously, 
both node and path embeddings are considered in order to arrive at the final vector 
representation. In one example, the node and path embeddings have been configured to 
each be 128-dimension vectors, and the final code vector is a 384-dimension vector. 
The code embeddings obtained above are at the function level of granularity and 
do not include the information about any enclosed function calls within them. To 
incorporate the complete functionality of a function, the embeddings of the functions that 
are being invoked from the main function of interest must also be considered. To achieve 
this, a combination property of code embeddings is used, and a call graph is formed to add 
the embeddings of the invoked functions as well. The function call stack depth is limited 
to three. The value of this limit can act as a hyper-parameter; expanding the value to three 
levels in the stack gives good results while not becoming too complex. 
 
Figure 3 
In the example code depicted in Figure 3, the code embeddings for each individual 
functions are initially obtained: 
sample_composite_function = E1, 
app_logic_function_helper1 = E2 
app_logic_function_helper2 = E3 
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Assuming that there are no other functions being invoked from 
app_logic_function_helper1 and app_logic_function_helper3, the new embedding for 
“sample_composite_function” can be defined as: 
sample_composite_function r = E1 + E2 + E3 
with the addition operator indicating vector addition. 
Next, the dataset is extended to include historic bugs associated with each function. 
For this, the Cisco Defect Tracking System (CDETS) data source is utilized to fetch the 
fixes associated with each bug, which are parsed to find all the functions that were modified 
(i.e. fixed) in the dataset. Open-source datasets may also complement the dataset that is 
used to represent the historic bugs. For example, the publicly available Draper 
Vulnerability Detection in Source Code (VDISC) Dataset can be used, which consists of 
the source code of 1.27 million functions mined from open source software, and labelled 
by static analysis for vulnerabilities. The dataset is analyzed and cleaned to remove any 
incorrect markings of common weakness enumeration (CWE) labels. Thus, the code 





Figure 4 depicts an example table of functions, embeddings, and associated bugs. 
Using the above trained “code2vec” model, the code vectors for every function 
present inside a dataset, such as the Draper VDISC dataset, are extracted. This acts as the 
initial labelled dataset, and consists of code vectors as independent variables and the 
marked CWE labels as dependent variables. 
Two sets of three-layer neural networks can be used to train the vectors: one set is 
trained with “vanilla” code embeddings and another is trained with composite code 
embeddings obtained by adding the embeddings of the functions invoked within them. The 
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composite embeddings can include the complete functionality of each module, which helps 
to identify errors that are spread across multiple functions. The other neural network helps 
to identify semantic and other errors within the block of code of a function. Next, a simple 
logistic regression model is used to combine the results of both models. The models are 




Figure 5 depicts an example of how two neural network models are trained for a 
classification task. Historical vulnerability data is considered to evaluate the performance 
of the trained model and to further fine-tune the model. For each function obtained, the 
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Figure 6 
Figure 6 is a flow diagram depicting a training and prediction phase. 
The results obtained by the models can be validated using two approaches: manual 
evaluation, and evaluation using an automated tool. When manual validation is performed 
on each predicted result, developers can also provide an additional label indicating whether 
the code contains issues such as application logic error other than CWEs. Additionally or 
alternatively, a set of security tools, such as Flawfinder, CPPCheck, Coverity, Clang, and 
the like, can be applied to determine whether the tools can identify the predicted CWEs. 
Using the feedback from either of these approaches, tune the model’s parameters are fine-
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Finally, the model is retrained using a dataset containing historical vulnerability 
data. During retraining, application logic errors are included as another dependent variable. 
 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 is a flow diagram depicting a fine-tuning of a trained model. This fine-tuning 
eliminates many false positives and also enables application logic errors to be included in 
the findings of the model. 
After fine-tuning, the model can be deployed. The model can be deployed into 
production using a batch mode approach or a real-time approach. In the batch mode 
approach, the predictive model is run for every function in a codebase, and the results and 
insights are shared with a developer. In a real-time approach, the model is integrated as a 
plugin in an IDE so that whenever a developer writes a new block of code, details can be 
provided regarding the probability of the code being buggy, and probable fixes can be 
suggested when possible. Suggested corrective actions can be selected by looking for the 
similarity of the given function to a function in the historical vulnerability database and 
then applying the fix that was done to close the bug. The similarity check can be performed 
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Figure 8 
Figure 8 is a flow diagram depicting the processing of a block of code to identify similar 





Figure 9 depicts a user interface of a model being applied to identify vulnerabilities 
and other errors in code. In an example use case, a developer can use an editor to type in 
the code as usual. While the developer is coding and/or once a function block is completed, 
details like potential bug count and similar functions and its associated bugs in the past. 
The model can also include a feedback loop for active learning. The developer may 
be presented with an option to provide direct feedback to the model about potential bugs 
that are being discovered by the tool to ensure that the system’s results do not stagnate over 
time. Advantageously, this data can be used to train new versions of the model. 
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If F represents a new function block that a developer is coding and L is defined as 
its label or the function name, code embeddings (E) can be extracted for the function of 
interest from the trained model according to the relation:  
 
To extract the embeddings, an AST representation is obtained, and each path context is 
encoded using the vocabulary set of training data. Based on the embedding E, functions 
are identified in a database that include embeddings (eD) closer to EL. The distance between 
the two embeddings should be less than the predefined threshold (t) for selection, as 




To incorporate the feedback, the code embedding that the model estimated for a 
given function is modified based on user feedback. For positive feedback from a user, the 
code embedding of the new function being developed is moved closer to the function 
tagged with the predicted vulnerabilities by a certain distance in n-dimensional space. The 
distance moved can be proportional to the logarithm of the number of positive votes of 
users. For negative feedback, the code embedding of the new function is moved farther 
away from the embedding associated with the function tagged with the predicted 
vulnerability. Again, the distance moved may be proportional to the logarithm of the 
number of negative user votes. 
If the model predicts that a function with label L and embedding EL is similar to 
one of the functions in the database having embedding as eD, and p is defined as the number 
of positive votes and n is defined as the number of negative votes received for this 
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In addition, the model can be retrained from scratch by using the current embeddings as 
the initial weights for every function in the database that includes the embedding for the 
recently added functions to maintain the model using the up-to-date codebase. The 
frequency of training can be decided by the domain experts and may be, for example, 
retrained on a monthly basis. 
One unique aspect of this model is the taking the composite code embeddings of 
each method for computation and prediction in addition to just the vanilla code embeddings 
of the function. To proceed using the composite vectors, it must first be demonstrated that 
the vectors are additive in nature, a hypothesis represented by Equation 4: 
If vector(funcA) + vector(funcB) = vector(funcC), this implies that C is doing the 
functionality of both A and B. 
Equation 4 
Approximately 250 subject functions were selected to serve as positive and negative use 
cases for this hypothesis. As a result, the cosine similarities were found to be greater than 
0.9 for positive cases, thus confirming the hypothesis. 
For the task of identifying similarity between two functions, a threshold distance 
of less than 0.4 was selected for two functions to be similar; this threshold provided an 
accuracy of 95%. 
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Figure 10 
Figure 10 depicts the trending of observed accuracy values at various threshold values. 
Values less than 0.4 resulted in higher false negatives, and values higher than 0.4 produced 
more false positives. Thus, a threshold value of 0.4 was selected as an optimum threshold 
to achieve the desired results. 
The model’s ability to identify vulnerabilities was tested in two iterations. In the 
first iteration, composite code embeddings were not considered, and the additional logistic 
regression was not performed. The results for the Bug Prediction task were obtained using 
historical bugs to see if the model predicts them beforehand on the functions associated 
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Figure 11 
Figure 11 depicts example results of the second iteration, which included composite code 
embeddings. This iteration resulted in a significant boost in the performance of the same 
bug prediction task described above, with an accuracy of around 78%. The new precision 
value was 0.81 with a recall of 0.82.  
 In summary, techniques are presented herein that apply machine learning and AI 
techniques to improve developer experience by enabling developers to avoid introducing 
potential bugs and/or vulnerabilities while coding.  Billions of lines of source code, which 
have already been written, are utilized as examples of how to write functional and secure 
code that is functional, secure, and contains fewer vulnerabilities. By leveraging this wealth 
of available data, which is complemented with state-of-art machine learning models, 
enterprise-level software solutions can be developed that have a high standard of coding 
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